What's wrong with contemporary philosophy? by Mulligan, Kevin et al.
Abstract Philosophy in the West divides into three
parts: Analytic Philosophy (AP), Continental Philoso-
phy (CP), and History of Philosophy (HP). But all
three parts are in a bad way. AP is sceptical about the
claim that philosophy can be a science, and hence is
uninterested in the real world. CP is never pursued in a
properly theoretical way, and its practice is tailor-made
for particular political and ethical conclusions. HP is
mostly developed on a regionalist basis: what is studied
is determined by the nation or culture to which a phi-
losopher belongs, rather than by the objective value of
that philosopher’s work. Progress in philosophy can
only be attained by avoiding these pitfalls.
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I: Philosophy in Three Parts
Philosophy in the West now divides into three
parts—Analytic Philosophy (AP), Continental Philos-
ophy (CP), and History of Philosophy (HP).
Analytic Philosophy, although it comes in many
varieties, has four striking properties. First, it is culti-
vated with every appearance of theoretical rigour.
Second, its practitioners do not, by and large, believe
that philosophy is or can be a science, i.e., they do not
believe that it can add to the stock of positive human
knowledge. Third, the philosophers who until very
recently were the most influential models in the pursuit
of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise—Chisholm,
Davidson, Armstrong, Putnam, Kripke, Searle ...—
have no obvious successors. Finally, AP has succeeded
in the institutional task of turning out increasing
numbers of highly trained, articulate, and intelligent
young philosophers. Each of these properties reflects a
relatively uncontroversial empirical claim.
Continental Philosophy comes in almost as
many varieties as does AP but is always decidedly
anti-theoretical. This is particularly true of those vari-
eties which sport the name ‘‘Theory’’, but it holds in
general of all those CP philosophical traditions in
which political goals are more or less pre-eminent. The
heroes of CP—Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze, Derri-
da—also belong to the past and they, too, have no
obvious successors.
The History of Philosophy is pursued by both ana-
lytic philosophers and their continental consoeurs. In
Continental Europe—with the exception of Scandina-
via and Poland—philosophy is, in large measure, just
the history of philosophy. In the Anglosaxophone
world most philosophers are not historians of philos-
ophy. The almost total identification of philosophy
with its history in Continental Europe reflects massive
scepticism about any theoretical ambitions on the part
of philosophy. These claims are also uncontroversial,
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as an examination of the publications of philosophers
in Continental Europe easily shows.
How is it possible for so many analytic philoso-
phers to pursue philosophy in a more or less rigorous
and always theoretical way and yet believe neither
that philosophy can be a science nor that it can add to
the stock of positive human knowledge? Sometimes
this combination is due to a conviction that philoso-
phy can never be other than aporetic. Sometimes it is
due to the belief that philosophy can aspire at most to
negative results. Sometimes it is due to the belief that
philosophy’s final goal is not theoretical (however
much theory may enter in along the way) but prac-
tical, for example, therapeutic. Sometimes it is due to
caution; sometimes to self-deception; and sometimes
to the insidious influence of Kant.
II: Analytical philosophy
Perhaps the most striking illustration of these claims is
provided by the fields of metaphysics and ontology
which, with logic, constitute the heart of theoretical
philosophy. Although metaphysics and ontology have
always been part of philosophy, and are perhaps more
popular within AP today than ever before, they are
still, there, the object of a scepticism which does not
apply to epistemology or even to practical philosophy.
The source of this scepticism is not difficult to locate. If
you think that philosophy is or can be a science, then
metaphysics and ontology clearly deserve their tradi-
tional central place within philosophy. If you are
sceptical about philosophy’s scientific ambitions, your
scepticism will be at its strongest in connection with
metaphysics and ontology.
Suppose we say that ontology is the study of what
there might be and metaphysics of what there is. Then
metaphysics is clearly inseparable from empirical sci-
ence. But it is thereby also inseparable from an interest
in the real world. Such an interest, it might naturally be
assumed, will extend for example to an interest in the
metaphysics of boundaries, such as the boundaries
between death and life or between health and sickness,
or to the metaphysics of quantities and qualities, of
powers and of functions, or indeed to the metaphysics
of any one of a number of domains which are today of
theoretical interest in the world outside philosophy.
But this interest in the real world is not, as it hap-
pens, a characteristic of analytic ontology and meta-
physics. Consider, for example, the metaphysics of
social objects and of social facts (of money and con-
tracts, wills and corporations). The questions proper to
this part of metaphysics might reasonably be thought
to be of great interest for any philosophy, practical or
theoretical, of political, social, and cultural phenom-
ena. But analytic metaphysics of the social world only
begins with the publication by John Searle in 1995 of
The Construction of Social Reality and it has still gone
little further than Searle.
Another example of the lack of interest in the real
world in analytic ontology and metaphysics is provided
by the sad story of current work in such fields as bio-
informatics, artificial intelligence, and the so-called
‘‘Semantic Web’’. Ontology and metaphysics ought
surely to be acknowledged as of great importance in
fields such as these.1 In fact, however, philosophical
confusion is the order of the day, because AP-philos-
ophers with some knowledge of ontology, manifest-
ing their horror mundi, have shown little interest in
grappling with the problems thrown up by these fields,
leaving it instead to philosophically naı¨ve exponents of
other disciplines to wreak ontological havoc. Philoso-
phers, for their part, occupy themselves with in-house
puzzles, ignorant of the damage their neglect is
wreaking in the wider world.
And what is true of ontology and metaphysics is true
of other parts of AP, too. In the recent history of AP a
series of puzzles have been mooted, flared up as trends,
attracted a significant portion of graduate students,
then died down again with no obvious solution having
established itself and the world not much the wiser.
These problems include: paradigms, rules, family
resemblance, criteria, ‘‘gavagai’’, Gettier, rigid desig-
nation, natural kinds, functionalism, eliminativism,
truth-minimalism, narrow versus wide content, possible
worlds, externalism versus internalism, vagueness,
four-dimensionalism, and, just now, presentism.
Although all the issues mentioned are genuinely
philosophical ones, they are pursued, still on the basis
of the attitude of horror mundi, among practitioners of
philosophy whose horizon extends little further than
the latest issue of Mind or The Journal of Philosophy.
The AP system of professional philosophy encourages
introspection and relative isolation because philosophy
is not seen as directly relevant to the scientific concerns
which prevail in the wider world. As a result, once the
main options have been explored, which takes between
2 and 10 years, it becomes hard to base a new career on
contributing to the debate, and so interest shifts else-
where, on to the next trend. The result is a trail of
unresolved problems. The problems are not unsolv-
able, nor are they unimportant, but the attempts to
solve them are insufficiently constrained by matters
outside philosophy conceived in a narrow and
1 ‘Gene Ontology’ already receives eight million google hits.
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incestuous way. They are insufficiently constrained,
too, by any attempt to build a synoptic system through
sustained, collaborative efforts, in which philosophical
theses about substance, matter, qualities, science,
meaning, value, etc. would hang together in a coherent
way.
In positive science results are expected. In AP
everyone waits for the next new puzzle. Like the
braintwisters holidaymakers take onto the beach,
philosophical puzzles divert from life’s hardships. They
doubtless have their place in a flourishing theoretical
culture. But AP is at its core a culture driven by puz-
zles, rather than by large-scale, systematic theoretical
goals. Russell recommended stocking up on puzzles
from as early as 1905;2 Analysis was founded as a
puzzle-solving journal. The quickest way to a career in
the competitive world of modern AP is to pick a puzzle
in a trendy area—be it vagueness, modal counterparts,
rigid designation, ‘‘the hard problem’’, or the elimi-
nation of truth—and come up with a hitherto unsus-
pected twist in the dialectic, earning a few more
citations in one or another of the on-going games of
fashionable philosophical ping-pong. F(a)ntological
philosophy triumphs,3 because elegantly structured
possible worlds are so much more pleasant places to
explore than the flesh-and-blood reality which sur-
rounds us here on Earth.
There is little doubt that individual philosophers
who have no interest in the real world can occasionally
make important contributions to philosophy. But a
philosophical tradition which suffers from the vice of
horror mundi in an endemic way is condemned to
futility. It may be, too, that in empirical science entire
research communities can briefly flourish without an
interest in the real world. But that is because, whatever
the interests and claims of scientists, the real world will
soon put them to rights if they diverge too far from
reality. Philosophers, on the other hand, cannot con-
front their ideas with reality in this same direct way.
That is why philosophical traditions can thrive which
are indifferent to the way the real world is.
III: Continental philosophy
And so in CP, too, metaphysics thrives. Claims about
the nature of reality and being, about possibility and
necessity, and about particularity and universality are
flourished ad nauseam by its practitioners. Moreover,
CP metaphysics is inseparable from a genuine interest
in the real world. But this interest is not theoretical.
First, CP metaphysics are invariably tailor-made for
particular political and ethical conclusions. Heidegger’s
1927 ontology is made for his lugubrious, supernatu-
ral Protestant naturalism. The multiplicities of Deleuze
and Guattari, in which difference is neither numerical
nor qualitative, are made for their corresponding
peculiar brand of soixanthuitard infantile leftism.
Habermas’ accounts of truth and of value are made
for a vision of politics in which all citizens would be
obliged to sit in on the equivalent of a never-end-
ing Oberseminar on Kant, talking their way to
emancipation.
Second, as with all other parts of CP, its metaphysics
is never pursued in any properly theoretical way. Just
as, in a good poem, content and form are inextricably
entwined, so too in CP the metaphysics is inseparable
from its idiosyncratic expression (‘‘diffe´rance’’).
Finally, CP’s interest in the real world is an interest in
the social and political world, never in the physical or
biological world. Only occasionally, when a scientific
theory or, more often, a piece of scientific jargon,
resonates with the CP metaphysician’s view of things
does he turn his attention to science (to catastrophe
theory, complexity theory, quantum gravity, Go¨del’s
limitation theorems) in order to play with a handful of
ill-understood expressions.
IV: History of philosophy
Consider two very different ways in which the history
of philosophy might be carried out, and in which can-
ons may become established and studied. At one ex-
treme there is history of philosophy as the history of
philosophy in particular regions, cultures, etc., where
the philosophy whose history is being studied is
determined by the nation, language-group, or culture
to which the philosopher in question belongs. At the
other extreme there is history of philosophy as the
history of the best of what has been thought, said, and
argued, where the philosophy whose history is being
studied, and the way in which it is studied, is deter-
mined by the conviction that philosophy can progress
because it has progressed.
How does the way the history of philosophy is now
done relate to these two possibilities? Unsurprisingly,
the nationalist (regionalist, ...) option is the rule: the
British above all study Locke and Hume, US philoso-
phers study Peirce and Dewey, the French have their
Malebranche and Bergson, the Germans Fichte and
Schelling. Of course, all analytic philosophers study
2 Though he never intended that puzzle-solving should become
the whole of philosophy.
3 See Smith (2005).
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Frege, Russell and Moore—and it sometimes seems as
though Wittgenstein has everywhere in the West been
elevated into the pantheon of great philosophers. A
small canon of modern philosophers, too, enjoys atten-
tion almost everywhere—Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz,
Kant. More importantly, interest in ancient and medi-
eval philosophy knows no geographical limitations.
Consider the second option. It is now a curiosity, not
a live option. Perhaps the last card-carrying believers
in this option were Brentano and some of his pupils. It
is now often felt that to take seriously the second
option is to be unfaithful to the proper task of the
historian. Some historians of philosophy in the analytic
tradition have been suspected of following this option,
but they now earn strong disapproval from those
historians who insist on raw textual exegesis and
disinterested tracking of influences.
We can summarize this opposition between two
kinds of history of philosophy as an opposition be-
tween the study of the philosophy of the past inde-
pendently of whether it is good, bad, or embarrassing,
and the study of past philosophical discoveries. The
latter, especially, requires an awareness of the distinc-
tion between philosophical achievements and blind
alleys. And this in turn requires a view of philosophy as
a theoretical enterprise that can lead to positive
knowledge.
Why does the former (in its various regional guises)
prevail? This is a large and difficult question. But one
prime reason why it prevails in Continental Europe is
that philosophy is not there taken seriously as a theo-
retical enterprise. Indeed the near total identification
of philosophy with its history leaves no breathing space
for theoretical philosophy and thus no fulcrum on
which to base a non-purely regionalist conception of
the history of the discipline. Instead we have a situa-
tion in which widespread familiarity with Fichte’s
egology, or with the details of Reinhold’s Auseinand-
ersetzungen with Kant, or with ontological difference a`
la Heidegger, coexists with almost complete ignorance
of, say, Bolzano’s account of the difference between
logical consequence and explanation.
In the AP world, in contrast, the history of philos-
ophy is an uneasy me´lange of the two main options.
AP’s history of philosophy is, to be sure, focused
always on topics of the familiar and reassuring logic,
mind, and language sort. But it is at the same time
strikingly indifferent to the history of just those ideas
which have there proved most fertile. Thus the enor-
mous commentary literature on Wittgenstein pays
almost no attention to the Austro-German context of
his main ideas. Anton Marty’s anticipations of Grice’s
account of meaning are unknown. So too are the
anticipations by Adolf Reinach of the theories of
speech acts developed by Austin and Searle.
CP’s lack of interest in philosophy as a theoretical
enterprise emerges most clearly in its relations to the
phenomenological movement. Heidegger, Sartre, Der-
rida, and many other prominent CP thinkers grew out of
phenomenology. At the same time, CP rejects the vision
of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise that was em-
braced by Husserl and the other great founders of phe-
nomenology—yet without making any attempt to justify
this rejection. Phenomenology has, in fact, served CP
well as a hydra-headed pretext—Marxist phenomenol-
ogy, feminist phenomenology, hermeneutics, Derrida’s
foaming defilements of what he calls ‘‘phallologocent-
rism’’—but in all these cases the aspirations of the
founders of phenomenology to uncover truth have been
made subservient to a non-theoretical agenda, whether
political or socio-cultural, and in Derrida’s case to an
agenda that is shamelessly anti-theoretical.
Moreover, in spite of the dominance of phenome-
nology in CP philosophizing, CP’s own history of phi-
losophy is strikingly ignorant of the history of
phenomenology itself. The loving attention lavished on
manuscripts by Heidegger or Fink coexists with near
complete ignorance of the writings of truly important
phenomenologists such as Reinach, Ingarden, or
Scheler.
V: The End
In Europe, CP has triumphed institutionally and cul-
turally even though, and indeed in part because, it has
never won any theoretical battles, flourishing best in
the feuilleton. In certain philosophy departments in
North America, too, CP is slowly moving towards
hegemony, aping the successes of CP-related anti-the-
oretical movements in US departments of sociology,
literature, cultural studies, geography, anthropology,
archaeology, and so forth. In the leading philosophy
departments in the Anglosaxon world, however, AP
still holds its place, though it has something of the
flavour of a self-perpetuating academic business, fre-
quently proud of its lack of relevance to real-world
concerns. HP on the other hand has almost everywhere
collapsed into nationalist or regionalist hagiography.
The major parts of 20th century philosophy thus end
in defeat. The tried and tested traditional reaction to
defeat is to rally round the flag. What Russell said
almost a hundred years ago is, as ever, timely:
There have been far too many heroic solutions in
philosophy; detailed work has too often been
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neglected; there has been too little patience. As
was once the case in physics, a hypothesis is in-
vented, and on top of this hypothesis a bizarre
world is constructed, there is no effort to compare
this world with the real world. The true method, in
philosophy as in science, will be inductive,
meticulous, and will not believe that it is the duty
of every philosopher to solve every problem by
himself. This is the method that inspires analytic
realism and it is the only method, if I am not
mistaken, by which philosophy will succeed in
obtaining results which are as solid as those of
science (Russell 1911, p. 61, our emphases).
The honest pioneering spirit of the early and con-
structive phase of AP had its close parallels also in the
early phenomenologists, so much so that a century ago
there existed no gulf between them. And it is precisely
this spirit that must be rekindled. Philosophers should
learn and practise their analytical skills. They should
prize the theoretical virtues of consistency, analytic
clarity, explanatory adequacy, and constrained sim-
plicity, be aware of the historical depth and pitfalls of
the ideas they are manipulating, and be wary of the
assumption that everything new is better. They should
trust to common sense, avoid bullshit, and beware
celebrity. But above all they should lift their heads
above philosophy: study and respect good science and
good practice, and try to understand their implications.
Like scientists, they should cooperate with one another
and with other disciplines, and seek funding for coop-
erative research, aiming at theoretical comprehen-
siveness, using topic-neutral skills and knowledge to
bridge compartments in knowledge. They should learn
how to present ideas clearly to all kinds of audiences,
and not just to fellow aficionados of the fake barn.
Above all, philosophers should be humble, in the face
of the manifest complexity of the world, the acumen of
their philosophical predecessors and non-philosophical
contemporaries, and their own fallibility. But with this
humility they should be unwaveringly resolved to dis-
cover, however complex, frustrating and unlovely it
may be, the truth.
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